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NOTES
Securities Regulation-Wellman v. Diekinson--"Tender Offer"
Definition Expanded to Include Private Transactions
Conventional cash tender offers involve a public invitation to all share-
holders of a corporation to deliver shares into a depository for a fixed pre-
mium during a limited time.' Tender offers flourished in the favorable
economic and legal atmosphere of the 1960's, providing an unregulated means
of gaining corporate control, despite resistance by hostile management. 2 In
1967 Congress recognized the solicited shareholder's need for advance infor-
mation disclosure during a tender offer by passing the Williams Act.3 Con-
1. For discussion of tender offers in general, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION 736-48 (4th ed. 1977); E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS
IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS]; Ein-
horn & Blackburn, The Developing Concept of "Tender Offer" An Analysis of the Judicial and
Administrative Interpretations of the Term, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 379 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Developing Concept]; Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Developing Meaning];
Note, The Scope of Section 14(d): What IsA Tender Offer?, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 375 (1973); Note, The
Courts and The Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 991 (1973); Note, Cash
Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1969).
2. The number of tender offers increased from eight in 1960 to over 100 in 1966, H.R. REP.
No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811
[hereinafter cited as 1968 HOUSE REP.], while the aggregate value of cash offers grew from under
$200 million in 1960 to almost one billion dollars in 1965. Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity
Ownershio and In Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on HR. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Sub-
committee on Commerce and Finance of the House Comrm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 House Hearings]. The sudden popularity
of this novel takeover form prompted one treatise author to disclaim that the term "derived from
any popular song or current movie..." H. BLOOMENTHAL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURI-
TIES LAw 431 (1966).
3. Act of June 29, 1968 (Williams Act), Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 14(d)-(f), 82 Stat. 454, (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (1976)), as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 3, 84 Stat. 1497
(amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b et seq. (1934)). Subsection 14(d)(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1),
makes it:
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce ... or otherwise to make a tender offer for, or a
request or invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity security which is registered
pursuant to section 12 of this title ... if, after consummation thereof, such person
would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5 percentum of such
class, unless at the time copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published orsent or given to s curity holders such person has ified with the Commission a statement
containing such of the information specified in Section 13(d) of this title, and any such
additional information as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Subsection 13(d)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78me(d), requires:
(1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of
any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to section 781/of this title..
is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class
shall, within en 1days after such acquisition.., file with the Commission a statement
containing such of the following information.
(A) the backround and identity, residence and citizenship of, and the nature of
such beneficial ownership by, such person and all other persons by whom or on
whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effectedre
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gress's failure to define the critical term "tender offer" in the Act,4 however,
has encouraged aggressive corporate investors to test the term's meaning
through unconventional and often ingenious tactics. Particularly notable was
Sun Company's (Sun) three-day, secret solicitation of thirty-four percent of
Becton-Dickinson Company's (Becton-Dickinson) outstanding stock from
thirty-nine major shareholders in early 1978. In Wellman v. Dickinson,5 a case
considering whether Sun's tactics constituted an unlawful "tender offer," the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found a
Williams Act violation and joined a small number of courts favoring a broad
interpretation of the Act.6 While the decision departs from majority and Sec-
ond Circuit7 understanding of the breadth of congressional intents in the Wil-
liams Act, it serves the Act's spirit without violating its legislative history.
Fairleigh S. Dickinson, Jr., son of a founder of Becton-Dickinson, became
disgruntled by his ouster in April 1977 from the company's board of direc-
tors.9 He recruited the investment banking firm of Salomon Brothers (Salo-
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be used
in making the purchases...
(C) if the purpose of the purchases. . is to acquire control of the business of the
issuer, any plans or proposals . . . to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or
merge with any other persons. . . or to make any major change in its business or
corporate structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owed. . . ; and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with any
person with respect to any securities of the issuer... naming the persons with
whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been entered into, and
giving the details thereof.
4. Although the legislative history does not indicate why Congress failed to define "tender
offer," several sources have concluded that an intentional omission resulted from Congress's de-
sire for flexible application of§ 14(d) to promote the broad remedial purposes of federal securities
laws. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 1. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,676, [1976-
77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,659, at 86,695-96 (August 8, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as 1976 SEC Release]. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
5. 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
6. Other cases allowing broad interpretation of"tender offer" are Smallwood v. Pearl Brew-
ing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Hoover v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [Current Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,107 (N.D. Ohio 1979); S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., [Current
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rr. (CCH) 1 96,750 (D. Mass. 1978); Loew's v. Accident & Cas.
Ins. Co., Civil No. 74C-1396 (N.D. IM. August 20, 1974); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F.
Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacatedperstipulation, Civil No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8,1972).
The SEC has naturally urged a broad view of the term in its administrative rulings. See, e.g.,
Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,192 (1972)
("adoption clause" in letter mailed to all target shareholders during a merger creates tender offer).
See also Einhom & Blackburn, supra note 1; Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer"
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250 (1973); Note, Scope ofSection
14(d): *hat is a Tender Offer, 34 OHIo ST. LJ. 375 (1973).
7. See notes 63-74 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 88-94 and accompanying text infra.
9. This "complex drama embrace[s] personality conflicts, animosity, distrust, and corporate
politics ... " 475 F. Supp. at 797-98. Dickinson had controlled Becton-Dickinson, a New Jersey
based hospital supply company, from 1948, when as a private company its sales totalled $10 mil-
lion, until 1973, when the public corporation's sales reached $300 million. Id at 798. Rivals
ousted Dickinson as board chairman on April 20, 1977, titling him "Honorary Chairman" but
stripping him of all power within the former family enterprise. Id at 799. In September 1977
they fired him as an employee, but Dickinson continued as director until February 13, 1978, one
month after Sun's takeover attempt. Id at n.16.
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mon) to find a company to buy his stock in conjunction with a Becton-
Dickinson takeover.' 0 Meanwhile, Sun had contacted Salomon after deciding
to diversify its holdings.11 Sun, after studies and discussions with its brokers
and lawyers, planned a "privately negotiated transaction" involving secret, si-
multaneous, off-market purchases from Becton-Dickinson's substantial indi-
vidual and institutional shareholders. 12
Beginning January 14, 1978, Salomon first bought approximately 19.3
percent of Becton-Dickinson's outstanding shares from Dickinson, his daugh-
ter and two other individuals.13 Then, immediately after the stock exchange
closed on January 16, Sun employees simultaneously telephoned about thirty
institutional shareholders nationwide. 14 They offered to buy Becton-Dickin-
son shares for either forty-five dollars outright, or forty dollars with protection;
the stock had traded that day on the market for about thirty-two dollars. 15
10. Dickinson and Salomon first considered, but rejected, both a proxy fight and selling
Dickinson's shares on the open market. Id at 799. F. Eberstadt and Sons, investment bankers,joined Salomon, and from spring 1977 forward, both worked zealously to interest a company in
buying part or all of Becton-Dickinson. They solicited Bristol-Meyers, Pepsico, Hewlett-Packard,
Avon, American Home Products, Monsanto, Shering-Plough, Hoffman-LaRoche, Squibb, and
finally, Sun. Id at 800-05. Most of these companies balked at a hostile takeover. Id at 800.
11. Id at 804. Suri, a Pennsylvania-based corporation and the nation's tenth largest oil com-
pany, Wall St. J., July 7, 1979, at 16, planned to diversify by investing outside the energy field. It
had intended to acquire a 20-50% interest in three or four companies over a three-year period,
investing $300400 million in each. Id
12. Id at 805-06. Two proposed meetings between Dickinson and Sun in December 1977
and January 1978 were aborted. Id at 804. On December 27, 1977, Sun, Salomon, Eberstadt, and
others discussed a partial tender offer, friendly takeover, and solicitation of substantial individual
and institutional shareholders, knowing that 40% of Becton-Dickinson's stock was so held. Sun
believed that a 10-13% block of shares, held by Dickinson and three other individuals, plus about
20% held by institutions, were available. Id at 805. On January 9, 1978, lawyers for Salomon and
Sun met and agreed that, because tender offer law was "murky" and the concept still imprecisely
defined, Sun would solicit no more than 60 shareholders to retain the offer's "private" character
and consequent exemption from § 14(d) of the Williams Act. Id Sun determined that 33.3% was
the optimal acquisition figure, allowing it use of equity accounting and a significant voice in Bec-
ton-Dickinson's direction. Id At discussions on January 10 and 11, strategists rejected a conven-
tional tender offer because subsequent competitive bidding would increase the price, and allow the
target company time for legal maneuvering. Instead, they wanted a procedure that would give
Sun quick possession of the desired shares. Id at 806. On January 13, Sun's executive committee
approved secret off-market purchases and authorized $350 million for a 34% acquisition. Id
13. Dickinson, who knew Sun's identity and had read its annual report, conditioned sale of
his 6.3% interest, see 475 F. Supp. 804 (1.2 million shares); 1 MOODY's INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1411
(1978) (19,004,586 outstanding shares in September 1977), on a similar offer to his friend Dun-
ning. 475 F. Supp. at 808. The interests of Dickinson's family and friends totalled about 2.5
million shares, id at 802, or about 13% of then outstanding shares. See 1 MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL
MANUAL 1411 (1978) (13,153 shareholders in September 1977). Sun had prepared a detailed
script for soliciting Dickinson and his individual allies, including Dickinson's daughter, Ann Tur-
ner, Dunning and one Lufkin (representing a partnership). 475 F. Supp. at 806 n.19. The script
outlined the proposed transactions and rules for disclosing Sun's identity. All the individuals and
institutions sold to Sun's brokers between January 14-16, 1978. Id at 808-10.
14. "This was a well structured, brilliantly conceived, and well executed project." 475 F.
Supp. at 820. At noon on January 16, Sun's telephone solicitors received instructions that stressed
absolute confidentiality and explained purchase contingencies. [d at 807-08, n.19. Just after the
exchange closed at 4:00 p.m., the telephone blitzkrieg began. Each solicitor, reading from a script
and beside a lawyer, generally said that a purchaser, sometimes described as "in the top fifty of
Fortune Magazine's 500," sought 20% of Beckton-Dickinson's stock. They ultimately revealed
Sun's identity to very few. Id at 810.
15. The two-tiered price offered a higher price ($45) with no recourse and a lower figure ($40)
with a guaranty to make up the difference between the lower price and the highest price Sun
1981]
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The callers generally requested responses within half an hour, but always by
no later than the next day, 16 and conditioned the purchases on acquiring a
total of at least twenty percent of Becton-Dickinson's stock. By midnight, the
solicited shareholders had orally committed thirty percent of the target's out-
standing shares.' 7 Three days later, Sun filed a Schedule 13D, a disclosure
statement required by section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act)' 8 when one purchases more than five percent of a class of a com-
pany's equity securities.' 9 Sun reported acquiring a total of thirty-four percent
of Becton-Dickinson's stock.20
The court consolidated for trial seven separate actions arising from this
transaction, including the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
charge that Dickinson, Sun, and others had violated sections 14(d) and (e) of
the 1934 Act, which, along with section 13(d), were added by the Williams Act
in 1968.21 The SEC primarily complained that Sun's purchases were a "tender
offer" resulting in acquisition of more than five percent of a registered equity
security, and unlawful because Sun had failed to make advance disclosures
required by the Williams Act in section 14(d).2 2 In a long opinion that consid-
ered several other issues,23 the court first determined that the program was a
public purchase, not a "privately negotiated transaction" exempt from the ad-
vance disclosure and filing requirements in section 14(d). 24 Next, addressing
eventually paid for any shares. This was a "most favored nation clause." Id at 805, 808. No one
chose the $40 price.
16. Callers said the order "was filling up fast and a hurried response was essential." Id at
810.
17. Id By 5:35 p.m. Sun had verbal commitments for 20% of the stock and a Sun official
began calling the institutions to accept on behalf of Sun's subsidiary, L.H.I.W. (an acronym for
"Let's Hope It Works"). Sun dispatched couriers to deliver its checks and collect the stock, thus
avoiding a depositary and ensuring possession before its identity became known. Id The NYSE
halted trading in Becton-Dickinson stock from the morning of January 17 until January 23. Id at
810-11. Once Becton-Dickinson learned of the takeover, it vigorously lobbied Congress and the
New Jersey legislature for SEC and state investigations, and began a media campaign to discredit
Sun. Id at 811.
18. Id at 811. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14(d), (e), 48 Stat. 881, as
amended by Act of June 29, 1968 (Williams Act), Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d), (e) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as "1934 Act"].
19. See note 3 supra.
20. 475 F. Supp. at 810-11. All the individual sellers had filed § 13(d) statements by January
24. Id at 811.
21. Id at 790-94.
22. Id Section 14(d) appears in full at note 3 supra. The opinion also outlined the civil
action against Sun and others, including five consolidated class actions. 475 F. Supp. at 795-97
(and accompanying notes). Consolidation of the civil actions occurred in Wellman v. Dickinson,
79 F.R.D. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Sun later settled these suits by paying the class $2.6 million. Wall
SJ., December 20, 1979, at 17.
23. Judge Carter also discussed the standing of Becton-Dickinson, Id at 816-17, and its
shareholders, id at 817; due process, id at 825-26; § 13(d)'s filing requirements, Id at 826-31, 832-
33; aiding and abetting by the brokers, id at 831-32; Rule lOb-13, id at 833-34; the Investment
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) to (e) (1976); and various minor issues, id at 834-36. The
heavily footnoted opinion spans 54 pages of the reporter.
24. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text infra. Senator Williams, introducing his bill,
recognized the case for pre-offer disclosure of private transactions. But he concluded that § 13(d)
disclosure, after consummation of a privately negotiated transaction, "'avoids upsetting the free
and open auction market,"' 475 F. Supp. at 818 (quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 856 (1967)), even though
private purchases may" 'relate to shifts in corporate control of which investors should be aware,'
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the key question whether Sun's purchases constituted a "tender offer," the
court found that because the transaction involved a premium bid for shares
and obligated Sun to purchase all or part of those shares upon certain condi-
tions, the scheme fell within the broad definition suggested by Senator Harri-
son Williams when he introduced the Williams Act.25 The court also tested
for the presence of eight elements proposed by the SEC as characteristic of a
tender offer;26 it found present seven of those elements, including "active and
widespread solicitation '27 of shareholders, but concluded that the eighth ele-
ment, publicity, was unnecessary28 because the Williams Act's purpose was
"to remove the secrecy that had heretofore cloaked transfers of corporate con-
trol."2 9 The court also rejected the argument that seller sophistication could
substitute for full disclosure.30
and allow operations "in almost complete secrecy concerning, .. intentions ... commitments
and even ... identities.'" Id at 817 (quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 856, 857 (1967)).
25. 475 F. Supp. at 822. Senator Williams, introducing his bill, described tender offers:
A cash tender offer usually involves a bid by an individual, group, or company to
buy a specified number of shares of a corporation's stock from the public at a specified
price---which is set above the market price in order to make the offer more attractive.
Those accepting such an offer are said to "tender" their shares for purchase.
Cash tender offers generally follow a simple pattern. The prospective buyer offers a
price far enough above the market to obtain the desired number of shares-usually an
amount sufficient to gain operating control of the corporation. As an aid in carrying out
his objective, the buyer generally hires a brokerage house to manage the offer, arranges a
loan to pay for the purchase, buys a few newspaper ads and issues press releases to
shareholders of the "target" company. If the number of shares tendered by stockholders
falls below the number desired, then all of the shares are returned and the acquisition
plan is cancelled. If the tender offer brings in more stock than the specified number of
shares bid for, the offeror may at his option buy only the number of shares for which he
has bid or may buy all of the stock tendered.
113 Cong. Rec. 855, 857 (1967).
The Senate Report accompanying the bill likewise identified as tender offer attributes a bid,
premium price, tender by shareholders, and the buyer's conditional obligation, S. REP. No. 550,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 SENATE REP.], and the House Report
adopted an identical definition. 1968 HousE RaP., supra note 2, at 2.
26. In recent cases, the SEC has suggested that courts consider eight factors when examining
a possible tender offer. Those elements are: (1) active and widespread solicitation of public share-
holders for an issuer's shares; (2) solicitation of a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) an
offer to purchase at a premium above market price; (4) firm, non-negotiable offering terms; (5)
purchases conditioned upon obtaining a set number of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum;
(6) limited time for offering; (7) pressure on offerees to sell; (8) public. announcements of the
purchasing program preceding or accompanying rapid share accumulation. 475 F. Supp. at 823-
24.
27. Id at 824.
28. Id at 822, 824-25. The court did not consider "the absence of one particular factor fatal
... because depending upon the circumstances ... one or more.., elements... may be more
compelling and determinative than the others," id at 835, and it dismissed the absence of public-
ity as insignificant to its decision. Id Judge Carter called use of newspaper advertisements a
recent phenomenon caused by management efforts to block access to shareholder's lists. Id at 822
(citing 1967 SENATE REP., supra note 25, at 229).
29. Id Senator Williams had perceived as "[tihe essential problem in transfers of control
resulting from cash tender offers or open market or privately negotiated purchases. . . that per-
sons seeking control in these ways are able to operate in almost complete secrecy concerning their
intentions, their commitments and even their identities." 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967) (remarks of
Senator Williams).
30. 475 F. Supp. at 823. But see Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities, Ltd. [1978-79 Transfer
1981]
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Even more important to Judge Carter than the particular elements of a
"tender offer," however, was that "Sun's acquisition [was] infected with the
basic evil which Congress sought to cure by enacting the law."'31 He con-
cluded that the purchase
was designed in intent, purpose and effect to effectuate a transfer of
at least a 20% controlling interest in BD to Sun in a swift, masked
maneuver. It would surely undermine the remedial purposes of the
Act to hold that this secret operation, which in all germane respects
meets the accepted definition of a tender offer, is not covered by Sec-
tion 14(d),. . . because Sun's coup was not heralded by widespread
publicity and because no shares were placed in a depository.32
Judge Carter refused to issue an injunction against future violations, in-
stead ordering maintenance of the status quo until he could determine dam-
ages in the trial's second phase.33 During the damages trial in December 1979,
Sun and Becton-Dickinson reached an out of court settlement in which Sun
agreed to divest its Becton-Dickinson shares.34
Until the 1960's, corporate takeovers typically proceeded either by proxy
solicitations, regulated under the 1934 Act,35 or securities exchange offers, sub-
ject to 1933 Act registration requirements.36 Cash tender offers proliferated
during the 1960's, exploiting a "gap in the existing scheme of investor protec-
tion."' 3 7 A typical cash tender offer then involved a formal, public offer to all
of a corporation's shareholders, to tender shares into a depository at a uniform
premium price.38 Senator Williams first introduced a bill requiring advance
disclosure by tender offerors in 1965.39 He sought to regulate the process
whereby "proud old companies [were] reduced to corporate shells after white
Binder] FED. Snc. L. RE'. (CCH) 96,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court found no tender offer upon
purchase from a few sophisticated investors).
31. 475 F. Supp. at 822.
32. Id at 822-23.
33. id at 837.
34. SEC v. Sun Co. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,209 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (settlement and divestiture agreement). See also SEC v. Sun Co. [Current Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 97,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (settlement modification); Wall St. J., Decem-
ber 20, 1979, at 17, coL2. Sun agreed to disgorge its Becton-Dickinson shares by issuing 25 year,
exchangeable debentures to the public. Id
35. Section 14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976). In proxy contests, management and
outsiders vie for corporate control by soliciting shareholder votes. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1976). A Securities exchange offer occurs when a corporation of-
fers its securities to the shareholders of another corporation in exchange for the target's shares.
Each offeree may individually accept or reject the offer. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcuiU-
TIES REGULATION 448 (4th ed. 1977).
37. 1968 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 10 (statement of SEC Chariman Manual Cohen).
38. Descriptions of tender offers typical during the 1960's appear in C. ScHARF, ACQUISI-
TIONS, MERGERS, SALES AND TAKEOVERS 160 (1971); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acqufl-
flon by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 335-37 (1967); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash
Takeover Bids, HARv. Bus. REv. 135, 141 (Mar.-Apr. 1967); Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-
over Bids.- Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 499, 502 (1967); Comment,
Regulation of Contested Cash Tender Offers, 46 Tax. L. REv. 115, 115-16 (1968); Comment, Senate
Bill 510 and the Cash Tender Offer, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 568, 569 (1968); Note, Economic Realities
of Cash Tender Offers, 20 ME. L. REv. 237, 241 (1968).
39. S. 2732, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 Cong. Rec. 28,257 (1965).
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collar pirates have seized control with funds from sources which are unknown
in many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up most of
the loot among themselves." 40 A revised version of Senator William's bill be-
came law in 1968.41
The Williams Act prohibits tender offers involving purchase of more than
five percent of the stock of a company registered under section 12 of the 1934
Act,42 unless the offeror has first filed with the SEC a statement revealing its
background and identity, fund sources and amounts, holdings in the target
company, and plans for the target's business or corporate structure.43 As
noted earlier, however, the Act did not define the crucial term "tender offer,"
leaving courts and the SEC to determine just what takeovers will trigger appli-
cation of its advance disclosure requirements. The SEC had consistently re-
fused to suggest a definition of the term until November 1979,44 when it
reversed its position and for the first time proposed a broad, two-tiered defini-
tion of "tender offer" 45 that would clearly comprise the tactics used in the
Becton-Dickinson takeover attempt.4 6
Tender offers, until the early 1970's, generally conformed to a conven-
tional pattern.47 A corporate investor, seeking control of a target company,
would hire an investment banking firm to manage the offer, then buy newspa-
per ads announcing a non-negotiable, premium price for the target's shares.
The offer would request shareholders to tender their shares into a depository
within a limited time. The depository could return the shares if the number
tendered fell below that specified in the offer, and the bidder could prorate
share purchases if shareholders tendered more than the desired number.48
The first case finding an unconventional tender offer unlawful appeared
in 1972. In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears,49 the only case before Well-
man holding an ostensibly private transaction to be a tender offer,50 the bidder
acquired over five percent of the target's stock by, soliciting almost all the
40. 111 Cong. Rec. 28,257 (1965).
41. Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (1976); see note 3 supra. While revising the bill,
Senator Williams consulted with SEC staff, NYSE members, private industry representatives, and
others. 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976). The original Williams Act applied only to acquisitions ex-
ceeding 10% of the target's stock, but in 1970 Congress amended § 14(d) to apply to acquisitions
exceeding five percent. Pub. L. 91-567, § 3, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(1), 78m(d) (1976); see note 3 supra.
44. In the 1976 SEC Release, supra note 4, at 86,695-96 (1976), the SEC concluded two years
of hearings on tender offers by expressly refusing to define the term because of its "dynamic
nature" and congressional intent that the term remain flexible. Id
45. Regulation 14D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 to 14d-101 (1979). Proposed Rule 14d-l(b), Se-
curities Exchange Act Release No. 16,385, [Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
82,374, at 82,603 (November 29, 1979) ("Proposed Rule").
46. The definition elements are discussed at notes 94-95 and accompanying text infra.
47. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
48. See note 25 supra.
49. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacatedper stipulation, Civil No. 72-152 (W.D.
Okla. May 8, 1972). See 1972 DuKE L.J. 1051 (1972). Cattlemen's involved a "creeping tender
offer," a series of purchases aimed at corporate control without public announcement. Einhorn &
Blackburn, supra note 1, at 384 n.20.
50. DEvELOPMENTs, supra note 1, at 3.
1981]
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shareholders by telephone, letters and personal visits during a forty day pe-
riod.51 Even though no publicity accompanied the overtures, the court held
that the "active and widespread solicitation" was a Williams Act tender offer,
because the tactics forced a hurried investment decision.52 The court implic-
itly assumed that such broadbased solicitation removed any private quality
from the purchasing program.5 3 The short opinion, however, did not explore
the Williams Act's legislative history, or identify the precise foundation for its
conclusion. Perhaps as a result, the only decisions accepting Cattlemen's have
involved notice to all shareholders, by mail or public advertising, and solicita-
tion of a relatively large number of shareholders.54
One year after Cattlemen's, a law review author suggested that methods
of securities acquisition that "are capable of exerting the same sort of pressure
on shareholders to make uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell which
Congress found the conventional tender offer was capable of exerting" should
be classified as tender offers under the Williams Act. 5 This "shareholder im-
pact theory" has since expressly or implicitly appeared in every decision con-
sidering whether an unconventional takeover method constituted a tender
offer. Few courts, however, have actually adopted the test, and most have
rejected it, especially when the solicitations reached only a small number of
shareholders.
For example, in Nachman Corp. v. Halfred,56 an Illinois federal district
court found no tender offer occurred when the bidder solicited forty of the
target's 600 shareholders, and ultimately achieved control by buying from a
financially sophisticated, "relatively small and powerful group" of fourteen. 7
Ostensibly applying the "shareholder impact test," the court nevertheless
51. Fears, the bidder, originally owned 4.86% of Cattlemen's shares, and eventually acquired
a total of 10%. 343 F. Supp. at 1250.
52. Id
53. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 5.
54. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
873 (1974) (tender offer occurred when, during merger, purchaser mailed premium offer to all
shareholders, imposed percentage requirements, and used depositary); Hoover v. Fuqua Ind., Inc.
[Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (bidder sent letters
to family group composing 1% of shareholders but owning 41% of target's shares, offering pre-
mium pnce, while target issued press releases); S.G. Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., [Current Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 96,750 (D. Mass. 1978) (bidder announced purchasing
plan, then bought 20% of target's shares during eight days from individuals and on exchange);
Loew's v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., Civil No. 74C-1396 (N.D. Ill. August 20, 1974) (tender offer
occurred when state distributed bidder's purchase plans to all target's shareholders just before
purchases occurred). Contra, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F2d 1195 (2d
Cir. 1978); Brascan, Ltd. v. Edper Equity, Ltd., [1978-79 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978-79 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rae. (CCH) 96,403 (D.D.C. 1978), reconsideration denied, [Current Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 96,511 (D.D.C. 1978) (no tender offer where bidder solic-
ited 30 of corporation's 9,600 shareholders on open market and privately, at premium); D-Z Inv.
Co. v. Holloway, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,799
(N.D. Ill, 1974) (settlement).
55. Developing Meaning, supra note 1, at 1275. Contra, Developing Concept, supra note 1, at
396.
56. [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 194,799 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (settlement).
57. Id, at 96,592.
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found the shareholders by nature unpressurable and in fact unpressured in
their selling decision.58 The Nachman court misinterpreted the test, which ex-
amines the potential rather than actual pressure of a transaction, 59 and appar-
ently concluded that such a small group of shareholders was insufficiently
"widespread" under the Cattlemen's requirement of "active and widespread
participation."60 In D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway6' a New York federal
district court reached a similar result. There, however, the court expressly re-
fused to apply the "shareholder impact test" to a program combining market
purchases with solicitation of twenty-four sophisticated shareholders and four
institutions in three months. Again, the small number of shareholders in-
volved, rather than the manner or potential effect of solicitation, apparently
directed the decision.62
Other federal courts in the Second Circuit, where Wellman v. Dickinson
arose, have quite recently disapproved the "shareholder impact" concept, and
have declined to extend Williams Act protection to novel takeover strategies.
In Kennecot Copper, Inc. v. Curtiss Wright Corp. ,63 for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that no tender offer
occurred in off-floor solicitations of fifty individual and twelve institutional
shareholders during forty-three trading days. The court found that no unusual
pressure existed and concluded that the Williams Act's substantive provisions
could not practically apply to unorthodox transactions.64 The Kennecou
transactions, however, bore few tender offer characteristics, such as premium
price, deadlines, and purchase contingencies, and most purchases occurred on
the exchange. 65
Similarly, in Brascan, Ltd v. Edper Equities, Ltd ,66 a case decided six
weeks before Wellman by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Judge Leval declined to apply the Williams Act to a
takeover in which the bidder's broker "scouted" thirty to fifty institutional and
twelve individual shareholders of the target company, offering to buy shares at
an "agreeable price." 67 The court, finding no tender offer "hallmarks," re-
jected cases effectively accepting the "shareholder impact test."68 The Brascan
58. Id at 96,591.
59. Even though the bidder repeatedly threatened the target's directors and president with
removal and corporate dissolution, id, the court somehow found no actual coercion, and therefore
no Williams Act violation. Id It thus misread both the Williams Act and the "shareholder im-
pact test" in analyzing this purchase of 30% of the target's stock.
60. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
61. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
62. The D-Z Investment Co. court found the "shareholder impact test" overly broad, and
even applying it in dictum, found that the purchases did not satisfy the test. Id at 96,563.
63. 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
64. Id at 1207.
65. Id at 1198.
66. [1978-79 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH) 96,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
67. Id at 95,631.
68. The Brascan court said that Edper acquired "a large amount of stock in open market
purchases, bidding cautiously so as to avoid bidding up the price of the stock to excessive levels
unless there was a large volume available at such a price. This [was] not a tender offer, even if a
large volume of stock [were] accumulated in such fashion." Id at 95,631. The court characterized
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Court found the Williams Act inapplicable to "open market" purchases, and
predicted that "crippling uncertainty" would result from adopting the SEC's
unfounded, eight-element tender offer test.69
The Wellman opinion offers a more expansive interpretation of the Wil-
liams Act. Judge Carter's first step was to consider whether Sun's program
was a "privately negotiated purchase," exempt from section 14(d)'s 70 advance
disclosure requirements but subject to section 13(d)'s 7' post-acquisition filing
requirements. To determine whether soliciting only thirty-nine shareholders
was not a private transaction, the court analogized to section 4(2) of the 1933
Act, which exempts "private offerings" from that Act's registration require-
ments.72 Those exemptions, however, are available only when an offeree, ca-
pable of fending for himself, enjoys or can compel such substantial access to
information about the offeror that formal disclosure through the SEC would
not further the purposes of the securities laws.73 In the Wellman transactions,
however, most offerees were unaware of Sun's identity. Although Judge
Carter did conclude that this was not a "privately negotiated purchase," only
the most cursory analysis should have been necessary to determine that Sun's
scheme did not bear any meaningful resemblance to private offerings exempt
under section 4(2).74
Judge Carter accepted the SEC's proposal that courts consider eight fac-
tors when analyzing whether section 14(d)'s advance disclosure requirements
the reasoning of Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacatedper
stpulation, Civil No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972) and S.G. Sec. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., [Current
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,750 (D. Mass. 1978) as follows: "[S]ince the
purpose of the Williams Act is to remedy certain problems found in tender offers, and since simi-
lar problems are to be found in other forms of stock accumulation, the Williams Act should cover
other forms of accumulation even though they aren't conventional." [1978-79 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,882, at 95,631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The court cited "serious problems
with this result-oriented approach," asserting that the
Williams Act legislative history shows it was passed with full knowledge of the difference
between tender offers and other forms of large-scale stock accumulation; its regulatory
scheme is inapplicable to a pattern of open market purchasing; and the SEC's eight-
factor test expands "tender offer' beyond the scope of Congressional intent.
Id at 95,631-32.
69. ld at 95,632.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1976). The Williams Act nowhere expressly distinguishes private
from public transactions, or exempts private purchases. Senator Williams, however, in proposing
the bill, expressly concluded that private purchases should be excluded, 113 Cong. Rec. 856(1967); see note 25 infra; and no one has ever suggested otherwise. See 475 F. Supp. at 817-18.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
72. Section 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1968), exempts from registration under the 1933 Act
"transactions by an issuer not involving a public offering." Private offerings, to receive the exemp-
tion, must meet very strict criteria established by case law, and generally only institutional pur-
chasers who enjoy complete access to information about the offering institution are exempted.
See Rule 146.
73. Ralston-Purina Co. v. SEC, 346 U.S. 119 (1953), the seminal case interpreting the § 4(2)
exemption, held the exemption available only when the offerees could "fend for themselves," id
at 125, and because of their position have access to all the information that the 1933 Act would
make available through a registration statement, id at 123.
74. The court eventually concluded that the transaction was not "private" because of the




apply to an unconventional takeover.75 He readily found present six elements
of that test: solicitation of a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; pre-
mium price; non-negotiable terms; purchase conditioned upon obtaining a set
minimum; limited time; and selling pressure.76 Carter also quickly found
present the test's first element, "active and widespread solicitation," 77 but in-
completely treated this important factor. Sun contacted only about thirty-
nine, or .3% of Becton-Dickinson's 13,000 shareholders;78 this was hardly
"widespread" bidding. No prior case had found a tender offer upon secret
solicitation of such a small percentage of shareholders. 79
The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code suggests
that soliciting more than thirty-five shareholders constitutes a tender offer, re-
gardless of how the offer proceeds.80 Sun, having solicited about thirty-nine
shareholders, exceeded that limit, though perhaps unintentionally. Even had
Sun solicited fewer than thirty-five shareholders, however, the Wellman court,
focusing as it did on the transaction's substance, rather than its form, would
probably have still concluded that a tender offer occurred. Indeed, the result
Sun achieved by soliciting such a small shareholder group demonstrates that a
numerical limit alone will not prevent abuses.81 Instead, a numerical limit
should create only a presumption that the transaction is a tender offer, and
solicitations of fewer than that number, upon proper proof, should also be
subject to section 14(d).82
The Wellman court properly resisted Sun's argument that publicity, the
75. Id at 824.
76. Id at 824-25.
77. Id at 824.
78. Defendant's Pretrial Brief No. 1 at 5, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
79. In Brascan, Ltd. v. Edper Equities, Ltd., [1978-79 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) T 96,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court found no "active and widespread solicitation of public
shareholders" because solicitations reached "only approximately [fifty] of Brascan's 50,000 share-
holders, each ... being either an institution or sophisticated individual holder of large blocks of
Brascan shares." Id at 95,632. The same result occurred in Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v.
Lance, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,403 (D.D.C. 1978), in which 30
sophisticated shareholders out of 9600 were contacted, and in D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway [1974-75
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 194,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), market purchases combined
with four private purchases from institutions, did not meet the "widespread" solicitation test. In
Hoover v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 97,107 (N.D.
Ohio 1979), however, the bidder's solicitation of about 100 shareholders out of 9,585, MOODY'S
OTC INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 952 (1978), owning 41% of the target's stock, was held to furnish
sufficiently "widespread" solicitation.
80. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 299.68 (Prop. Official Draft March 15, 1978). This is known as
the "bright line" test.
81. Becton-Dickinson's highly concentrated shareholder mix before the acquisition, with 813
shareholders, many of them institutions, holding 17.5 million of the 19 million shares, id at 802,
made the company more vulnerable to Sun's tactics than the average company. Studies, however,
show increasing concentration of shareholdings in large institutions, with the estimated percentage
held by institutional investors increasing from 14.5% in 1949 to 33.6% in 1975. NEw YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 50 (29th ed. 1979). This trend suggests the undesirability of a numerical
limit in the tender offer definition.
82. See Moylan, Exploring the Tender Offer Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 43 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 551, 581-82 (1968). Some commentators have urged that the factors truly crucial
to a tender offer are the number and percentage of shareholders solicited, percentage being the
more significant. See Developing Concept, supra note 1, at 396-97.
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SEC test's eighth element, is necessary for finding a tender offer, even though
widespread knowledge among the target's shareholders, whether achieved by
mailings or public announcements, has appeared in all previous cases apply-
ing the Williams Act to unorthodox tender offers.83 Judge Carter reasoned
that Congress had disdained secrecy in transfers of corporate control,84 but
failed to articulate the truly important point: publicity is relevant only be-
cause of its potential for creating pressure upon shareholders. Potential selling
pressure was the unidentified "basic evil"85 attacked in Wellman; both a
"swift, masked maneuver" 86 shrouded in secrecy, such as Sun's purchases, and
conventional, publicized tender offers carry that potential. Judge Carter, how-
ever, did not discuss the "shareholder impact" idea in distinguishing and re-
jecting other cases, perhaps because most of those cases have explicitly
rejected that test.8 7
Commentators have urged a legislative definition of "tender offer," to re-
lieve uncertainty in financial and legal circles and to avoid disruption and
confusion in corporate management. 8 The plights of Sun, having agreed to
divest its ill-gotten holdings through a complicated sale,89 and Becton-Dickin-
son, whose stock value declined after the takeover attempt,90 epitomize the
disruption feared by those who seek legislative definition. Yet as recently as
February 1979,91 the SEC had formally declined to define the term because of
the "dynamic nature of these transactions and the . . .[Commission's] ...
need to remain flexible in determining what types of transactions, either pres-
ent or yet to be devised, are or should be encompassed within the term."92
83. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
84. 475 F. Supp. at 822, 825.
85. Id at 822.
86. Id at 823.
87. See text accompanying notes 56-68 supra. The court also rejected Sun's argument that
the Williams Act's language and substantive structure rendered the Act inapplicable to unortho-
dox takeover attempts. See Defendant's Pretrial Brief No. I, supra note 78, at 50-54. Specifically,
Sun had urged that by their terms pertinent subsections could not apply to its takeover. They
argued that the following sections had not been violated: § 14(d)(1), requiring information filing
before "copies of the offer. . . are first published or sent or given to security holders;" § 14(d)(5),
mentioning securities "deposited" with a depositary; and § 14(d)(7), requiring payment of in-
creased prices to all tenderors, when shareholders had deposited stock in depositaries. Id at 50-
53. See Note, Scope of Section 14(d): Wiat is a Tender Offer?, supra note 1, at 389 (any transac-
tion to which subsections 14(d)(5)-(7) cannot practically apply does not constitute a tender offer).
Judge Carter quickly rejected these arguments, however, because nowhere does § 14(d) require
these characteristics or restrict "tender offer" to such applications. He also noted that Sun dis-
trusted depositaries because it wanted "physical possession of the stock certificates as quickly as
possible." 475 F. Supp. at 823.
88. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
COIORATE CONTROL 76 (1973); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv. L. REV. 377, 389 (1969).
89. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
90. Becton-Dickinson's stock declined $1.25 per share to $34, one day after the Wellman
opinion was announced. Wall St. J., July 11, 1979, at 16. On December 22, 1979, the stock traded
at an average price of $33 per share, Raleigh News & Observer, December 22, 1979, at 23, and in
May 1980, it sold at $34 per share. Wall S.J., May 23, 1980, at 46. Also, the number of Becton-
Dickinson shareholders dropped from 13,135 in September 1977, 1 MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MAN-
UAL 1411 (1978), to 11,426 one year later. 1 MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1453 (1979).
91. Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 15,548 [1979 Transfer Binder] 81,935, at
81,213 (February 5, 1979).
92. 1976 SEC Release, upra note 4.
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The Commission finally departed from its policy of non-definition in No-
vember 1979 by proposing a broad, two-tiered definition of "tender offer."93
The proposed rule's first tier would extend Williams Act coverage to transac-
tions bearing four characteristics: 1) an offer to purchase, or solicitation of an
offer to sell, securities; 2) during any forty-five day period; 3) directed to more
than ten persons; 4) that seeks to acquire more than five percent of that class of
securities. 94
Independently, the definition's second tier would reach transactions
showing three qualities: 1) widespread dissemination of the offers or solicita-
tions; 2) at a premium price greater than both five percent of, or two dollars
above, the security's current market price; and 3) without meaningful opportu-
nity to negotiate price and terms.95
Clearly the proposed definition responds directly to Sun's imaginative
tactics, which would certainly fall within the first tier's reach, and would also
be embraced by the second tier, assuming Judge Carter's interpretation of
"widespread dissemination" endures. Final adoption of the proposed rule
would effectively codify in the Regulations the Wellman v. Dickinson holding.
The proposed rule narrows that holding only by establishing ten persons as the
minimum number of offerees necessary for a tender offer, as courts would un-
likely find less than that number sufficiently "widespread" under the defini-
tion's second tier.96
Any administrative or congressional definition of "tender offer" stricter
than the proposed rule appears unwise. Recent cases such as Wellman, and
well-known SEC interpretations of the term, give fair notice to bidders of the
criteria courts may consider in determining Williams Act coverage. Indeed,
even before Wellman, one could sense the danger of purchasing tactics that
potentially created pressure to sell without adequate information. Further
definition of "tender offer," a term of art, could bar its development along with
changing takeover methods, and invite ingenious investors such as Sun to vio-
late the prohibition's spirit by complying with its letter.97
93. Proposed Rule, supra note 45. The SEC, reiterating earlier themes, based the proposed
definition on the "complexity of securities transactions, the diverse and dynamic nature of tender
offers, and the need to provide adequate protection of investors within the purposes of the Wil-
liams Act," and concluded that the "two-tier approach. . . is feasible, and capable of providing
guidance and certainty, and would not be unduly burdensome to prospective bidders." Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 16,385 [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 82,374, at
82,604-05 (November 29, 1979). The SEC has also new proposed legislation that would replace
§ 14(d) with a statute reaching any acquisition of 10% or more of a company's equity securities, no
matter how achieved. The proposal aims to avoid current definitional problems, increase cer-
tainty and reduce the regulatory burdens and litigation. Letter from SEC Chariman Harold Wil-
liams to Sen. Win. Proxmire [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) T 82,453, at
82.911 (February 15, 1980).
94. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 82.374, at 82.603-04. The second
tier uses no specific percentage test, time period or number of offerees or solicitees. See id at
82,603.
95. See notes 73-79 and accompanying text infra.
96. See note 12 supra.
97. See 1972 DuKE LJ. 1051, 1059. Many important terms in securities law, such as 'secur-
ity' itself, and in other statutory fields remain undefined, and courts have acknowledged that this
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Arguably, Wellman will discourage private purchases aimed at transfer-
ring corporate control, further insulating complacent and inefficient manage-
ments from challenge. Actually, however, Wellman only discourages
disguising tender offers to circumvent the Williams Act advance disclosure
requirements. Williams Act coverage of these transactions is important be-
cause target shareholders deserve protection from unidentified purchasers with
unknown plans for the company's future, and from secret, noncompetitive bid-
ding that denies selling shareholders opportunities to realize full economic
value for the shares.
No case involving an unorthodox takeover has presented facts so compel-
ling for expansion of the term "tender offer" as does Wellman v. Dickinson.
Sun's tactics, which sought to travel just on the recognized boundary of the
tender offer concept, were indeed "infected with the basic evil which Congress
sought to cure."9 8 Judge Carter relied on legislative history and the philoso-
phy behind the 1934 Act in distinguishing the limited views of "tender offer"
elsewhere. The court, in reaching its holding, inadequately treated some per-
plexing failures and ambiguities in the Williams Act's history, structure, con-
tent and judicial interpretation. It left unanswered questions about how
"widespread" solicitation must be, and what, if any, numerical limits should
control. Future cases and SEC rulings may settle these issues and others. This
decision remains important for its reasoned approach to a hard problem, when
pedantic orthodoxy would have denied the spirit of the Williams Act.
LAURANCE DAVIDSON PLESS
practice intended to preserve flexibility in achieving congressional intent. See, e.g., Appalachian
Coal, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 345 (1933) (construing antitrust statutes).
98. 475 F. Supp. at 822.
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